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THE REGULATORY RATCHET: WHY REGULATION BEGETS 
REGULATION—FATAL FLAW IN THE MARKET FOR HEALTH 
CARE 
Mark R. Lee* 
Regulation routinely functions like a ratchet, a tool designed to apply 
force in one and only one direction. Whatever else regulation does, it 
almost always begets more regulation. Part I of this article explains why 
and how the regulatory ratchet works. It focuses on the incentives to 
regulate and the suppression of information about its impact.1 Part II 
illustrates the explanatory power of the regulatory ratchet model by 
tracing a handful of its major turns in the market for health care. Finally, 
Part III (1) argues that the likelihood that regulation will beget more 
regulation ought to figure in any cost-benefit analysis of a proposed 
regulation and (2) suggests how the regulatory ratchet model might be 
refined to facilitate its use. 
I. HOW THE RATCHET WORKS 
Proponents of a regulation invariably advocate it as a “solution,” or 
“partial solution,” to one or more “problems.” Each “problem” manifests 
itself, according to proponents of the regulation, as a set of outcomes that 
they deem undesirable. If the regulation is adopted, it might ameliorate 
these “problems.” But it also might not. The people subject to the 
regulation might adapt to it in such a way that it has little or no effect on 
the “problem.”2 The connection between the regulation and the “problem” 
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Diego School of Law. I am grateful to Scott A. Carlson, Esq., a partner at Seyfarth Shaw, for providing 
the inspiration to write this article; Professor John Drobak (Washington University), Nathan R. Lee (Ph.D. 
candidate, Stanford University), Dylan Scott (law student, UCLA), Professor Steven Smith (San Diego), 
and Professor Maimon Schwarszchild (San Diego) for comments on earlier drafts; and Dr. Glenn Bloom, 
Esq., Brandon Harmon, Esq., Julia Kapchinskiy (law student, San Diego), Brady McAnich, Esq., Jason 
Miller, Esq., Timothy O’Hern, Esq., Eric Rakestraw, Esq., Brandon L. Rebboah, Esq., Yan Ren, Esq., 
David Serrano, Esq., Heather Schlesier, Esq., Dylan Scott, Dr. Sameer Vohra, Esq. for research assistance. 
 1. Information suppression may be only one strategy used by proponents of a regulation to 
increase potential opponent’s transaction costs. Charlotte Twight, Political Transaction Cost- 
Manipulation: An Integrating Theory, 6 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 189 (1994). 
 2. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1960). 
Adaption to regulation plays a major role in the “law of unintended consequences.” 
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might be largely symbolic;3 or the “problem” might be an urban legend.4 
For a variety of reasons, the regulation might have no discernible effect 
on the “problem;” it might even aggravate the problem. 
Whatever the likely impact of the regulation on the “problem,” it will 
not dictate the behavior of the regulators. Their behavior will be dictated 
by the benefits that they can expect to derive and the costs that they can 
expect to incur as a result of adopting the regulation.5 These expected 
benefits and costs will depend little, if at all, on whether the regulation 
ameliorates the “problems,” has no discernible effect on them, or 
aggravates them. If it ameliorates them, the regulators will capture little, 
if any, of the resulting benefits. Regulators, like other decision makers in 
the wondrous world of government, almost always find it extraordinarily 
difficult, if not impossible, to capture an appreciable portion of the 
benefits resulting from their decisions. On the other hand, they rarely, if 
ever, bear an appreciable portion of the costs. The mechanisms that cause 
decision makers in markets to bear an appreciable portion of the costs 
resulting from their decisions, mechanisms such as price and product 
competition, do not operate as effectively, or simply do not operate at all 
in government. So, even if a regulation were to aggravate the “problems” 
its proponents claimed that it would “solve,” the regulators could 
reasonably expect to incur few, if any, of the resulting costs. 
Typically, a large diffuse bunch of people will bear these costs. Bearing 
these costs may strike each of these people as an undesirable outcome and 
therefore a “problem” about which “someone ought to do something.” 
This “problem” would disappear, of course, if the regulators were to 
reverse course. Reversing course, however, is likely to garner little, if any, 
organized political support, and it would almost certainly generate 
substantial opposition. Opposition would come from three groups: (1) 
individuals who believe that they do or will derive net benefits from the 
regulation, (2) lawyers and other service providers who help people seek 
benefits from the regulation, and (3) the folks who supply these benefits 
profitably.6 Opposition would also come from the regulators—after all, 
 
 3. For example, in the aftermath of the “financial crisis” regulation of pay incentives for bank 
executives enjoyed widespread support despite lack of evidence that pay incentives played a significant 
role in the risky decisions made by some bank executives. Jeffrey Friedman, Bank Pay and the Financial 
Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2009), at A21.  
 4. Joel Best & Gerald T. Horiuchi, The Razor Blade in the Apple: The Social Construction of 
Urban Legends, 32 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 488 (1985). 
 5. Fred McChesney, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL 
EXTORTION (1997). 
 6. Grocers are prominent lobbyists against any reform of the food stamp program, formally 
known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, likely to appreciably reduce the number of 
recipients. Heather Haddon & Jesse Newman, Retailers Worry Food-Stamp Overhaul Will Hit Them 
Hard, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/retailers-worry-food-stamp-overhaul-
will-hit-them-hard-1523016003. 
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they adopted the regulation because they expected to derive net benefits 
from doing so. In the event of a political battle, the people deriving 
benefits from the regulation, their enablers and suppliers, and the 
regulators could count on loud support from the reflexively pro-regulation 
majority of journalists, commentators, and pundits. 
Such political battles, however, do not take place often because the 
people who bear the costs of regulation rarely put up much of a fight. 
Typically, the cost-bearers will not have organized themselves to wage 
political battle (had they done so, they might have forestalled the 
regulation), and organizing them would cost far more than each individual 
cost-bearer could expect to gain from repealing the regulation. In most 
cases, only a small portion of those bearing the costs of the regulation will 
take notice of it. The cost per affected person usually grows over time, 
remaining small in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the 
regulation when the cost might register with those affected and they might 
perceive the causal connection. Of the cost-bearers who take notice of the 
regulation, few will appreciate that repeal would relieve them of these 
costs. Appreciating the value of repeal customarily requires information 
about the regulation’s devilish details. Precious few cost-bearers will 
possess such information, and they will have little, if any, incentive to 
acquire it since they will not expect to influence the relevant decision-
makers. Moreover, the regulation itself usually obscures information 
about its impact, most often by relying on taxation and transfer payments 
or by using coercion to prevent markets from impounding such 
information into prices. And regulators commonly engage in 
supplemental efforts to suppress such information.7 For most people, the 
required information may as well have passed beyond the event horizon 
of a “black hole.” 
Typically, most of the people who bear the cost of a regulation will 
remain rationally ignorant of its likely impact unless the regulation fails 
 
 7. Charlotte Twight, Medicare's Origin: The Economics and Politics of Dependency, 16 CATO 
JOURNAL 309 (1997). A dramatic example occurred during the run up to Obamacare. The legislative draft 
proposed to slash spending on Medicare Advantage plans by $123 billion over a ten-year period. Humana, 
a major issuer of such plans, sent a letter to its Medicare Advantage customers warning them that “millions 
of seniors and disabled individuals could lose many of the important benefits and services that make 
Medicare Advantage health plans so valuable.” The letter urged the recipients to contact their 
Representatives. Senator Baucus, principal sponsor of the draft legislation complained to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services which ordered Humana to cease and desist distributing “misleading and 
confusing” information and announced an official probe into the company’s actions. Baucus Bludgeons 
Humana, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2009). Many efforts at information suppression target pharmaceuticals, 
especially pricey pharmaceuticals. These include refusal to disclose data used in federally funded studies 
purportedly showing “overuse” of various drugs, Scott Gottlieb, The War on (Expensive) Drugs, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118843412251712953, and FDA imposed 
limitations on the promotion of “off-label” uses of approved drugs. Scott Gottlieb, Stop the War on Drugs, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119786300762133127. 
3
Lee: The Regulatory Ratchet
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
726 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
to obscure its impact or swiftly triggers headline-grabbing undesirable 
outcomes. But headline-grabbing outcomes do not occur often. Even 
when they do, they often arise or become manifest long after the adoption 
of the regulation, which makes it considerably more difficult to perceive 
the cause of these undesirable outcomes. The paucity of information about 
the impact of the regulation will undermine the argument for repeal. 
Meanwhile, the ranks of individuals who believe that they do or will 
derive a net benefit from the regulation and their enablers and suppliers 
will likely grow and become better organized. 
Of course, the regulation will continue to trigger undesirable outcomes. 
The persistence of this “problem” may fuel calls for a “solution” or 
“partial solution,” one that takes the form of additional regulation. The 
call for such a “solution” might come from the ranks of the cost-bearers 
but it is more likely to come from their self-appointed advocates among 
journalists, commentators, and pundits. In any event, these people will 
provide political support for more regulation. Even regulation-skeptics 
may embrace more regulation as a second-best “solution” to the 
“problem.” For that matter, the regulators who caused the “problem” may 
support more regulation as a “solution” to it. Such chutzpah is unlikely to 
generate much, if any, blowback because of the paucity of information 
about the impact of the regulation, while the regulators may reasonably 
expect to derive benefits from engaging in additional regulation. In the 
political arena, more regulation is likely to defeat repeal.8 
The new regulation, like the old, is likely to cause a large diffuse group 
to incur costs that they otherwise would not have incurred. Bearing these 
costs will strike members of this group as an undesirable outcome, 
perhaps amounting to a “problem” about which “someone ought to do 
something.” If doing something becomes sufficiently attractive 
politically, the ratchet is likely to be turned again. 
II. THE RATCHET AT WORK IN THE HEALTH CARE MARKET 
The health care market provides graphic illustrations of the regulatory 
ratchet at work.9 They are graphic, and sometimes poignant, because the 
“undesirable outcomes” caused or exacerbated by each turning of the 
ratchet frequently manifest themselves as physical suffering and, on 
 
 8. The Administrative Procedure Act and its state equivalents may make repeal more difficult. F. 
H. Buckley, The ‘Swamp’ Needs a Justinian, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-swamp-needs-a-justinian-1524178574. 
 9. Holman Jenkins, Libertarian Dream of Pharmaceuticals, WALL ST. J. (OCT. 30, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/libertarian-dream-of-pharmaceuticals-1446238152. 
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occasion, as death10—hence the health care market’s “fatal flaw.” Surely, 
proponents of these turnings did not wish to bring about these outcomes. 
No surprise there; the regulatory ratchet generally operates in accordance 
with the “law of unintended consequences.” It certainly did in connection 
with one of the earliest, and probably most critical, turnings of the ratchet 
in the health care market: giving employer-purchased health insurance a 
tax advantage. Part II of the article discusses this and four other turns of 
the ratchet: Medicare; the Prospective Payment System and HMOs; state 
mandated insurance coverage and claims review processes; and 
“Obamacare.”11 
A. Employer-Purchased Health Insurance Becomes Tax-Advantaged 
Backstory 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided that “[g]ross income 
include[d] gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or 
compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form 
paid.”12 This appeared to make payments by an employer for an 
employee’s health insurance taxable to the employee. The IRS had ruled 
that payments by employers for employees’ accidental death and 
disability insurance constituted “gross income.”13 It had not had occasion 
to rule in connection with payments for employees’ medical and 
hospitalization insurance, which were relatively rare prior to the outbreak 
of World War II.14 
The value of such insurance was far less than it is today because doctors 
could do far less for the sick and injured, and the price of what they could 
do was comparatively low. Medical care then consisted much more than 
it does today of palliatives and first-generation antibiotics; it was not until 
World War II that penicillin went into widespread use. Even when 
hospitalized, patients had far fewer treatment options than they have 
today. Indeed, treatment options were so limited that an important health 
insurance benefit for a substantial number of people was a fixed sum 
 
 10. Many examples appear in Stephen Westaby, OPEN HEARTS (Basic Books 2017); Robert 
Francis, REPORT OF THE MID STAFFORDSHIRE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST PUBLIC INQUIRY (2013): John 
Stossel, Sick Sob Stories, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2007), at A16. 
 11. The health care market provides a cornucopia of ratchet turnings, including widespread and 
extensive regulation of drugs, physicians, and hospitals. 
 12. Internal Revenue Code of 1939 §22(a). 
 13. The IRS had ruled that payments by employers for employees’ accidental death and disability 
insurance constituted “gross income.” Reg. 45, Art. 33 (revised April 17, 1919). 
 14. In 1940 the population of the United States about 132 million of which only 12 million were 
covered by some form of health insurance. SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 1981-82 
(Washington Health Insurance Institute, 1982) p. 13. 
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payment for each day spent in the hospital.  
Employer payments for employees’ medical and hospitalization 
insurance became more common after the Office of Price Administration 
(“O.P.A.”) adopted wage caps in 1941.15 These caps made it problematic 
to compete for labor by offering higher wages. So as the demand for labor 
grew apace with war-related production and the supply of labor shrank as 
civilians became soldiers, employers competed by offering benefits that 
were not subject to the O.P.A.’s wage limits16—such as medical and 
hospitalization insurance. 
Even though these benefits substituted for wages, the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, as amended by the Stabilization Act of 1942,17 
excluded most insurance from employees’ taxable income while 
preserving its deductibility by employers. Since employees faced 
marginal tax rates as high as 85%, this exclusion made employer-
purchased health insurance extraordinarily cheap. This tax advantage 
survived the repeal of wage and price controls. Subsequently, Congress 
enshrined it in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.18 
This tax advantage triggered critical unintended consequences. For 
instance, health insurance coverage expired with employment. This 
provided ammunition for the advocates of Medicare—one of the most 
important turns of the regulatory ratchet. The remainder of this section 
explains why and how this came to pass. 
Tax Advantage = Price Reduction 
The tax advantage made it cheaper for an employee to obtain health 
insurance as part of his compensation rather than purchase it for himself 
 
 15. Exec. Order No. 9250, 1942 WL 4218, 7 F.R. 7871 (Oct. 3, 1942). 
 16. Cf. Offering such goodies became sufficiently commonplace that unions sought to make them 
the subject of negotiations. In 1949, the National Labor Relations Board opined that "wages" included 
insurance and pension benefits, so employers had to negotiate with unions about them. Steelworkers (AFL-
CIO) (Inland Steel Co.), 77 NLRB 1 (N.L.R.B. 1948), aff’d Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B. 170 F.2d 247 
(7th Cir. 1948). 
 17. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 901 et seq., 56 Stat. 23, (1942). 
 18. I.R.C. § 105(b) (West 1954). Prior to the 1954 amendments only certain types of health 
benefits had to be reported as income. For instance, payments made by the employer directly to 
commercial insurance companies for group medical premiums of employees were not taxable as employee 
income, but private programs of an employee association or employer were taxable. The IRS attempted 
to specify which types of employer-provided health care resulted in taxable income for the employee. See 
1943 C.B. 86; Rev. Rul. 54-1; Int. Rev. No. 13 at 2 (1953); I.T. 4107, 1952-2 C.B. 73. The distinctions 
drawn by the IRS were questioned by the Seventh Circuit in Epmeier v. United States, 199 F. 2d 508 (7th 
Cir. 1952). For the most part, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 resolved this conflict in favor of the tax 
advantage. According to the legislative history, this was done in part to eliminate substantially different 
tax treatment of similarly situated recipients of employer provided health insurance based on the technical 
nature of the plan for providing the insurance. H.R. 1337, 83rd Cong. (2nd Sess. 1954). See also, Taxation 
of Employee Accident and Health Plans before and under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222, 224 (1954). 
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(even if he could purchase a “group policy”). To illustrate, consider 
Bernie, an employee paid $50,000 in annual wages subject to income tax 
at the rate of 20%. If he were to purchase a health insurance policy 
requiring a $3,000 annual premium, his remaining after-tax earnings 
would amount to $37,000 [$50,000 in wages minus $10,000 in taxes (20% 
of $50,000) minus the $3,000 premium]. His remaining after-tax earnings 
would rise to $37,600, however, if Bernie’s employer were to purchase 
the policy and provide it to him in lieu of $3,000 in annual wages [$47,000 
in wages minus $9,400 in taxes (20% of $47,000)]. The tax advantage 
would yield what amounts to a $600 “price” reduction for Bernie. The 
higher the marginal tax rate, the greater the price reduction.  
Because of the price reduction, an employee like Bernie, who had 
planned to purchase health insurance for himself, would want his 
employer to purchase it for him. Indeed, he might even want his employer 
to purchase more insurance for him than he would have purchased for 
himself. Suppose that two otherwise identical policies would pay different 
amounts in the event of hospitalization: an insurance policy with a $3,000 
premium would pay 70% of a $1,000 bill ($700), while a policy with a 
$3,100 premium would pay 80% of it ($800). And further suppose that 
the prospect of this larger payout is worth $90 to employee Shira. If Shira 
were purchasing health insurance for herself, she would choose the 
cheaper policy. The calculus changes, however, if Shira can obtain her 
insurance as part of her compensation. Assume that Shira receives 
$50,000 in annual wages subject to income tax at the rate of 20%—just 
as Bernie does. If her employer were to purchase the $3,000 policy for 
her, Shira’s after-tax earnings would amount to $37,600 just as Bernie’s 
would. Obviously, her after-tax earnings would decline if her employer 
were to purchase the $3,100 policy for her and reduce Shira’s wages by 
an additional $100, but they would not decline by $100. Her earnings 
would decline by only $80 [$46,900 in annual wages minus $9,380 in 
taxes (20% of $46,900) = $37,520]. She would want her employer to 
purchase the more expensive policy for her because she would forego 
only $80 in wages in return for additional insurance worth $90 to her.  
The same reasoning explains why an employee who would not have 
purchased health insurance for himself might want his employer to 
purchase a policy for him. Consider Nathan who is also paid $50,000 in 
annual wages subject to income tax at the rate of 20%. Suppose that the 
$3,000 health insurance policy was worth only $2,600 to him, so if he had 
to purchase it for himself, he would not do so. Nathan’s after-tax earnings 
would then amount to $40,000 [$50,000 in annual wages minus $10,000 
in taxes]. But if he were to obtain the insurance as part of his 
compensation in lieu of $3,000 in wages, his remaining after-tax earnings 
would amount to $37,600 [$47,000 in wages minus $9,400 in taxes (20% 
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of $47,000)]. The health insurance policy worth $2,600 to Nathan would 
cost him only $2,400 in foregone wages. 
To sum up the tax advantage, (1) all employees who were planning to 
purchase health insurance would prefer that their employers purchase it 
for them; (2) some employees would prefer that their employers purchase 
more coverage for them than they would have purchased for themselves, 
and (3) some employees would prefer that their employers purchase 
health insurance for them even though they would not have purchased it 
for themselves. Because employees like Bernie, Shira, and Nathan would 
prefer to substitute employer-purchased health insurance for some of their 
monetary compensation, an employer can get more competitive bang for 
its compensation bucks by catering to this preference. If the gains from 
catering exceed the transaction costs of purchasing the health insurance 
and providing it as compensation, an employer will find it advantageous 
to cater. And because of the tax advantage an employer who purchases 
health insurance for its employees will tend to purchase more insurance 
than his employees would have purchased for themselves. This additional 
coverage helped obscure the price of medical care just as the tax 
advantage helped obscure the price of health insurance. 
The Golden Rule of Insurance Policy Selection: He Who Dispenses the 
Gold Selects the Policy 
While an employer who purchases health insurance for its employees 
will find it advantageous to purchase more insurance than his employees 
would have purchased for themselves, it will almost certainly not find it 
advantageous to select the same coverage they would have selected. It 
would be costly to do so because it would have to ascertain the 
preferences of each employee and purchase multiple policies. And 
irrespective of cost, coverage that served its employees’ interests might 
not serve the employer’s 
To illustrate, suppose that two identically priced policies differ only in 
the coverage provided for (1) pregnancy and childbirth and (2) 
diaphragms, birth control pills, and medical procedures that prevent 
conception. Policy A provides comprehensive coverage for pregnancy 
and childbirth but barebones coverage for conception preventatives; 
Policy B does just the opposite. Policy A would tend to encourage 
conception more than Policy B. Since pregnancy and childbirth may result 
in increased absenteeism and turnover which would be costly to an 
employer, it might select Policy B even though an appreciable number of 
current employees would have selected Policy A. 
Consider another illustration with far reaching implications for the 
operation of the regulatory ratchet in the health care market. Suppose two 
8
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identically priced policies differ only in duration and deductibles. Policy 
C has a $750 annual deductible but provides coverage only while the 
employee works for the purchasing employer. Policy D has a $7,500 
annual deductible but would permit the employee to continue coverage 
after his employment ends at the same premium price his employer would 
have paid. An employer might select Policy C even though some of its 
present employees would have selected Policy D. 
What Employer-Purchased Health Insurance Wrought  
The spread of tax-advantaged employer-purchased health insurance 
left millions of employees and their families covered by policies that 
expired when their employment ended. Had these employees been 
purchasing coverage for themselves, most would have strongly preferred 
guaranteed renewable policies. But when their employers purchase their 
insurance, many employees prefer policies that expire when employment 
ends.19 Here is why: Recall that employer-provided health insurance 
receives advantageous tax treatment only if it is provided as part of the 
employment relationship. Therefore, a policy that remained in force after 
the expiration of the employment relationship could qualify for the tax 
advantage only if a cash method employer had already paid the premiums 
for the post-job period or paid them as deferred compensation. An 
employer who made these additional payments would offset them by 
providing his employees with less pay or less valuable benefits than the 
employer otherwise would have provided.20 This trade off would hold 
little, if any, appeal to many employees and potential employees, 
especially those who expect that they could readily land a job with another 
employer who purchased health insurance for their employees if their 
current employment relationship ended.  
Employees whose employer-purchased health insurance ended with 
the employment relationship would have placed some value on an option 
to buy post-employment health insurance for a premium that a healthy 
individual of the same age would have paid. The sale of the option–a 
renewal guarantee sold as a stand-alone policy—did not become widely 
available until the late 2000s. In 2009, such policies cleared regulatory 
approvals in 25 states.21 The value of these policies declined dramatically, 
 
 19. Perhaps some employers select such policies to discourage job-hopping by employees, a 
straightforward application of the golden rule of insurance policy selection. 
 20. The reduction in pay or benefits would not be as great if an employer promised the health 
insurance as deferred compensation (presumably, the reduction would equal the discounted cost of the 
insurance plus the deferred compensation scheme), but the employee would bear some risk that the 
employer might not abide by his promise. 
 21. Michael Cannon, A Chance to Overcome ObamaCare, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2018), at A19. 
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however, when Congress enacted Obamacare which required nationwide 
community rating beginning in 2014. The alternative - maintaining 
individual insurance alongside insurance purchased by their employers -
did not hold any appeal for most employees, especially the large number 
of employees who expected that they could readily land a new job which 
provided employer-purchased health insurance for employees. Even these 
employees might still have been interested in post-retirement health 
insurance, but interest in such insurance in the years following World War 
II was less keen than it is today when (1) life expectancy is longer, (2) 
doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceuticals can do more, and (3) the price of 
medical care is higher.22  
Employer-purchasing of health insurance eliminated vast numbers of 
relatively healthy individuals as potential purchasers of health insurance 
for themselves and their families. Most individuals purchasing insurance 
for themselves and their families keep their policies for less than 24 
months while between jobs. Premiums for the remaining potential 
purchasers rose to reflect this fact, and rising premiums no doubt 
prompted some individuals to economize by buying less coverage or 
doing without health insurance. Some of these economizers surely 
incurred more uninsured medical expenses as a result; some may have 
foregone timely medical services. The frequency and severity of these 
unfortunate outcomes increased over time as (1) medical services became 
pricier, reflecting both the cost of providing advanced medical care and 
burgeoning moral hazard, and (2) advances made medical services more 
useful to more people and extended the lives of sick people. 
For obvious reasons, senior citizens figure prominently among those 
who experienced these unfortunate outcomes. As a group, they have more 
frequent and more serious health problems than working-age people, and 
because of the substitution of employer-purchased for employee-
purchased health insurance, they were more likely to have less health 
insurance coverage. 
Eliminating the tax advantage for employer-purchased health 
insurance would have reduced the incidence of these outcomes, especially 
among senior citizens. With the tax advantage gone, more employees 
would have purchased their own health insurance. To compete for these 
customers, insurers would have had to respond to their demands for 
policies that met their preferences. This would have triggered a decline in 
the number of people lacking post-job health insurance.23 Despite these 
virtues, elimination of the tax advantage garnered little, if any, political 
 
 22. Brigitte C. Madrian, Gary Burtless, & Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Health Insurance on 
Retirement, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1994). 
 23. John H. Cochrane, What to Do about Pre-existing Conditions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203609204574316172512242220. 
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support during the 1950s and 1960s. 
 It appears that no Senator or Representative publicly proposed 
elimination of the tax advantage. Perhaps behind-the-scenes efforts by the 
real beneficiaries of the tax advantage helped keep the politicians in 
check. After all, some of the real beneficiaries, such as the people who 
underwrote more insurance because of the tax advantage,24 wielded 
considerable political clout. 
The “victims” of the tax advantage—including people who lacked 
post-job or post-retirement coverage because of it—certainly did not 
advocate its elimination. Elimination would have provided them with no 
short-term benefits. Besides, the impact of the tax advantage was 
probably lost on most of them, obscured in part by the passage of time. 
The pricing of health insurance might have brought the impact home—
except because of the tax advantage, relatively few purchased health 
insurance for themselves. To gauge the impact of the tax advantage, an 
individual would have needed to expend appreciable time and energy—
which most people would find difficult to justify since they could not 
reasonably expect to influence members of Congress. Insofar as the 
“victims” gave the tax advantage any thought, most of them probably 
considered themselves beneficiaries since they did not pay income tax on 
the value of the health insurance that their employers purchased. 
The plight of people who lacked post-job, including post-retirement, 
health insurance coverage, however, did evoke loud lamentations from 
many journalists, commentators, and pundits. Most of the lamenters 
called for a “solution” to the “problem” that was manifested by the plight 
of the uninsured25 (then, as now, most of the lamenters assumed that lack 
of health insurance coverage resulted not only in uninsured medical 
 
 24. Recall that, thanks to the tax advantage, some employers purchased more insurance for their 
employees than their employees would have purchased for themselves. And some of the people who sold 
health insurance to employers may have enjoyed a comparative advantage selling to them rather than 
individuals. 
 25. In 1959, the “plight of the uninsured,” especially the elderly uninsured, was the focus of 
hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Problems of the Aged and Aging (of the Committee of Labor 
and Public Welfare Committee on Labor and Public Welfare). One retired school teacher testified: 
 
I am one of your old retired teachers that has been forgotten. I am 80 years old and 
for 10 years I have been living on a bare nothing, two meals a day, one egg, a soup, 
because I want to be independent. I am of Scotch ancestry, my father fought in the 
Civil War to the end of the war, therefore, I have it in my blood to be independent 
and my dignity would not let me go down and be on welfare. And I worked so hard 
that I have pernicious anemia, $9.95 for a little bottle of liquid for shots, wholesale, 
I couldn't pay for it. 
 
U.S. Senate, 86th Congress; Washington D.C. 1959.  
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expenses, but a lack of medical care26). In the health care market, when a 
“problem” becomes sufficiently salient, it always fuels demands for 
additional regulation. It has rarely elicited calls for revisiting existing 
regulation that almost certainly caused or aggravated the “problem.”27 
Few, if any, of those lamenting the plight of the uninsured advocated 
elimination of the tax advantage. Almost all of the lamenters urged 
another turn of the regulatory ratchet; a legislative promise to pay for 
some medical services, at least for retirees. 
B. Medicare: Legislative Promises to Pay for Some Medical Care 
In the event, the legislative promise to pay for some medical services 
took the form of Medicare. Once coupled with appropriations and an 
administrative organization to process claims, it provided covered 
individuals with a form of health insurance. 
Legislative insurance would not necessarily reduce the frequency with 
which covered individuals incur uninsured medical expenses or the size 
of those expenses. To illustrate, consider individuals who, absent the 
legislation, would have been insured by a commercial policy providing 
equal or better coverage. For these people, the legislated insurance could 
not reduce either the frequency with which they incurred uninsured 
medical expenses or the size of those expenses. But it could trigger 
increases in both, and it could do so not only for those individuals, but 
also for the less insured. It could trigger increases due to moral hazard—
the risk that insured individuals might change their behavior at the 
expense of an insurance provider once the insurance becomes effective. 
Once the legislated insurance became effective, covered individuals 
would tend to demand more covered services than they would have had 
they borne the price charged for the services.28 A rise in the amount of 
 
 26. Lack of health insurance almost certainly prompts some individuals to forego or delay 
obtaining some medical care. It is difficult to ascertain how many individuals do this and to what extent. 
Some uninsured obtain free or low-priced medical care either as the beneficiaries of charity or as non-
payers. The uninsured secure better medical outcomes than do people covered by Medicaid. Scott 
Gottlieb, Medicaid Is Worse Than No Coverage at All, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704758904576188280858303612. “Peer-reviewed 
studies from the National Health Insurance Experiment and other data dating back to 1980s have 
concluded that there is little or no causal relationship between health insurance and a person’s health 
outcomes.” John F. Cogan, Glenn Hubbard, & Daniel P. Kessler, The Wrong Remedy for Health Care, 
WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304870304577490212540553078. 
 27. “Root causes” do not seem to hold the same appeal in this context as they do in others. 
 28. David Card et al, The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care 
Utilization: Evidence from Medicare, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 2242, 2257 (2008). This tendency is 
especially strong among those who purchase Medicare supplemental coverage, a substantial majority of 
Medicare recipients. 
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covered services demanded would cause prices to rise for everyone, 
including people covered by commercial health insurance. When the 
commercially insured obtained these services, the companies providing 
this insurance bear the higher price. So, these companies must raise 
premiums for a given coverage, which would prompt some purchasers to 
economize by seeking reduced coverage or by foregoing health insurance 
altogether. Obviously, individuals with reduced or no coverage incur 
uninsured medical expenses more frequently than they would have 
incurred them had they not economized, and these expenses would be 
greater than they would have been had the legislated insurance not 
triggered a rise in the price of medical services. In this way, legislated 
insurance could trigger increases in both the frequency with which 
individuals incurred uninsured medical expenses and the size of these 
expenses. 
Commercial health insurance companies respond to moral hazard risk 
by limiting whom they insure and the coverages they provide, and by 
setting deductibles and co-payments that curb their insured’s demand for 
covered services. These measures reduce moral hazard risk, but rarely 
eliminate it. Therefore, commercial insurance companies charge 
premiums that reflect this residual risk. Absent measures to reduce moral 
hazard risk, increases in the amount of covered services demanded would 
continuously drain the coffers of insurance companies and reduce these 
companies’ market value. Reductions in their market value would pose a 
serious threat to the present and future wealth of its executives. 
Legislators do not face this threat since the mechanisms of the business 
world that tie the wealth of executives to the value of their companies do 
not operate in the world of electoral politics. So if legislators crafting 
legislated insurance fail to respond to moral hazard risk as commercial 
insurance companies do, they face negligible, if any, threat to their present 
or future wealth even though their failure would cause a continuous, 
severe, and ultimately unsustainable drain on the U.S. Treasury.  
This drain would eventually cause most voters to incur costs. If voters 
were likely to blame the costs on the legislated insurance, the drain could 
threaten the electoral prospects of the legislators supporting the insurance. 
But voters are far more likely to blame commercial health insurance 
companies, doctors, hospitals, and others demanding payment. Few 
voters would blame the legislated insurance because the relationship 
between it and the costs incurred as a result of its enactment would 
probably be lost on them. Prices for health insurance and medical services 
would not bring home the relationship. The price of employer-purchased 
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health insurance is embedded in a compensation package29 and distorted 
by the tax advantage, while the price of legislated insurance is hidden by 
taxes and transfers. Many voters may perceive both kinds of insurance as 
“free.” Of course, health insurance itself obscures the price of medical 
services. 
Tracing how the legislated insurance eventually caused one to incur 
costs would require data gathering and analysis that few voters would 
have an incentive to do. Neither task would be easy; why undertake them 
when your vote would almost certainly not affect the outcome of the next 
election, much less the fate of the legislated insurance? A voter might rely 
on reports prepared by interest groups with sufficient incentive to gather 
the requisite data and undertake the required analysis, but sorting the 
reliable reports from the unreliable ones would itself require work. For 
the vast majority of voters, information about how the legislated insurance 
eventually caused them to incur costs is likely to pass beyond the “event 
horizon” and into a “black hole.” So, if legislators crafting legislated 
insurance failed to respond to moral hazard risk, as commercial insurance 
companies do, they would probably not suffer at the polls. Indeed, they 
might benefit. 
Advocating for legislation can help a legislator continue to hold elected 
office in a number of ways, including facilitating fundraising and 
garnering favorable, or at least neutral, media attention. Advocating 
legislation that promises “goodies” to millions of non-organized 
individuals, as legislated insurance does, can also attract votes. Since all 
votes count the same, the number of votes attracted by the legislation 
tends to matter more to a legislator than the intensity of each voter’s 
attraction. Thus, legislators ordinarily find it politically advantageous to 
sacrifice some of the total value of the promised “goodies” in favor of 
increasing the number of voters (and their financial dependents) to whom 
the promise is made, or better yet, the number likely to cash in on the 
promise before the next election.30 When the “goodie” is legislated health 
insurance, the two most expedient ways to increase the number of voters 
to whom the promise is made are by: (1) promising to pay for medical 
services consumed by many people, regardless of their health or 
behavior,31 and (2) setting deductibles and co-payments at a level lower 
than a commercial insurance company would. This kind of expediency 
 
 29. The price of employer-purchased insurance, of course, is the difference between what the 
employee voter would have been paid had the employer not purchased insurance for him and the pay that 
he actually receives. 
 30. In the world of business, a decision maker who sacrificed some of the total value of a product 
in favor of increasing the number of people purchasing it would probably bear an appreciable portion of 
the resulting costs. 
 31. So, coverage for catastrophic expenses holds relatively little political appeal. 
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practically guarantees a moral hazard that, if unchecked, would threaten 
the U.S. Treasury with a continuous, severe, and ultimately unsustainable 
drain, a moral hazard that no commercial insurance company could 
tolerate. The original structure of Medicare’s hospital cost coverage 
illustrates such expediency: it covered hospital costs from the first day of 
hospitalization with only a $40 deductible (coinsurance of $10 per day 
did not kick in until the 61st day), but Medicare did not cover hospital 
costs after 90 days of hospitalization.32 This meant that Medicare did not 
protect seniors from financial hemorrhaging due to medical costs, even 
though that was the “problem” for which Medicare was designed to solve, 
according to almost all of the program’s proponents. 
Congress did empower the Department of Health and Human 
Resources to, in effect, modify the legislated insurance through rule 
making,33 and the Secretary has delegated this power to the bureaucrats 
at what is now known as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services.34 Of course, these bureaucrats have no more incentive than 
legislators to mimic the response of commercial health insurance 
companies to moral hazard risk. In fact, senior bureaucrats might have 
even less incentive because curbing the amount of covered services 
demanded might make “growing the bureaucracy” more difficult. 
Nevertheless, empowering bureaucrats to make modifications appeals to 
legislators. Doing so economizes on their time and effort, partially 
insulates them from the political fallout that might result if modifications 
were to be met with disapproval from various segments of the population, 
and creates a ready target for electorally advantageous criticism.35 
 
 32. The “1966 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust 
Fund” and “The 1966 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Supplementary Medical 
Insurance Trust Fund” both prepared for the Speaker of the House of Representatives by Henry H. Fowler, 
W. Willard Wirtz, John W. Gardner, and Robert M. Ball (https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/Trustees-Reports-Items/1966-1969.html 
(1966 Medicare HI Trustees Report) - Plan A and (1966 Medicare SMI Trustees Report) - Plan B). 
Presently, the deductible for each benefit period of up to 90 days is $1,346 with coinsurance of $341 per 
day for days 61-90. After 90 days, a covered person has a total of 60 additional “lifetime reserve” days to 
use over one or multiple periods with a $682/per day coinsurance for such days. 
https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/inpatient-hospital-care. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(h)(h). 
 34. Delegation of Authority; Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, Federal Register (Mar. 14, 
2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/03/14/2011-5779/delegation-of-authority-
centers-for-medicare-and-medicaid-services. Obamacare empowered CMS to modify Medicare directly 
on a trial basis via the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. 42 U.S.C § 1315a(a). The Center is 
authorized to test implementation of new payment and delivery models, which the Secretary may then 
expand nationwide through rulemaking. 42 U.S.C § 1315a(c). The statute provides selection criteria 
requiring that the models address certain groups and reduce program costs while preserving care quality. 
42 U.S.C § 1315a(b)(2)(A). The statute also provides criteria by which the Secretary is to determine 
whether to discontinue, modify, or expand the model; these criteria focus on changes in the quality and 
cost of care under the model. 42 U.S.C § 1315a(b)(3)(B); § 1315a(b)(4); § 1315a(c). 
 35. David Schoenbrod, Only Congress Can Undo Its Regulatory Mess, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/only-congress-can-undo-its-regulatory-mess-1497821745. 
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 Besides, legislators in succeeding Congresses could make their own 
modifications, and they would almost certainly find it electorally 
advantageous to do so as medical science advances and population 
demographics change. But successor legislators would have no more 
incentive than their predecessors to adopt terms like the ones used by 
commercial health insurance companies to reduce the amount of covered 
services demanded by insureds. To the contrary, successor legislators 
would almost certainly find it politically advantageous to make promises 
that would compound the moral hazard, such as promises to pay for 
additional medical services and to pay for these services for more people. 
Successor legislators did just that.36 
Of course, mounting moral hazard risk compounds the threat to 
continuously and severely drain the U.S. Treasury. If the drain were to go 
unchecked, it would eventually generate pressure to raise taxes, foster 
inflation, or forego otherwise electorally advantageous appropriations. 
These actions could prove electorally problematic, so Senators and 
Representatives would eventually take steps to limit the drain even though 
such steps would generate political opposition from the people who 
expected that the legislated insurance would enrich them. 
C. Price Controls & Rationing: The Prospective Payment System and 
HMOs 
Repealing Medicare would have plugged the drain on the U.S. 
Treasury. So too would assessing beneficiaries a charge for coverage 
equal to appropriate actuarially determined premiums—the functional 
equivalent of a repeal. Like most proposals to reverse previous turns of 
the regulatory ratchet, these measures lacked political appeal. So too did 
less radical measures that would have slowed and perhaps substantially 
reduced the drain on the Treasury, such as: (1) delaying the age at which 
Medicare coverage begins; (2) restructuring Medicare as a defined 
contribution or voucher program (as many employers were doing with 
their employee health insurance plans37); (3) reducing the services 
covered by Medicare, say to treatment for catastrophic illnesses; or (4) 
employing mechanisms used by commercial health insurance companies 
in response to moral hazard risk.38 Such measures would have required 
 
  36.  For example, in 1972, Congress extended coverage to individuals under 65 suffering from 
long-term disabilities or end-stage renal disease. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Publ. L. 92-603, 
92nd Congress, H.R. 1 (October 30, 1972). In 1980, Congress authorized reimbursement for additional 
home health services. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-499 § 930, 94 Stat. 
2599 (1980. 
 37. E.g. Textron, Inc. Barbara Martinez, Health Plan That Puts Employees in Charge of Spending 
Catches On, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2002), at B1 col. 2. 
 38. For example, beneficiaries could be given a choice of plans that have lower premiums, but 
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that members of Congress (1) forego some of the electoral advantage that 
had prompted their predecessors to enact Medicare and (2) incur the 
opposition of people who stood to derive significant wealth from the 
program. This our Senators and Representatives were, and are, unwilling 
to do. Rather, they expanded the scope of Medicare to cover more people 
and services. For example, in 1972, Congress extended coverage to 
individuals under 65 suffering from long-term disabilities or end-stage 
renal disease.39 In 1980, Congress authorized reimbursement for 
additional home health services.40 Obviously, expansions such as these 
increased the drain on the Treasury. 
To address the drain, Congress adopted the Prospective Payment 
System41 (“PPS”), requiring that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services establish caps on payments made for Medicare claims pursuant 
to a complicated formula.42 The caps were to be based on the average 
accounting cost of treating a medical problem belonging to a particular 
diagnostic group. According to the committee reports for the bill that 
mandated PPS, it was intended to give medical service providers an 
incentive to operate efficiently.43 
Under some circumstances, price controls can create such incentives in 
the short run. The PPS regime may have done so because it took effect 
when previous turns of the regulatory ratchet had made it prohibitively 
expensive for most providers and patients to quickly opt out of Medicare. 
 
higher deductibles, more coinsurance, or a smaller provider network. 
 39. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Publ. L. 92-603, 92nd Congress, H.R. 1 (October 30, 
1972). 
 40. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-499 § 930, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980. 
 41. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149 (1983) 
codified as 42 USC § 1395ww (applicable to charges for in-patient hospital care), 1395xx (applicable to 
physician services). 
 42. Specific RVUs [Relative Value Units] are preassigned to the submitted CPT [Current 
Procedural Terminology] and HCPCS [Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System] codes and are 
divided into technical, professional, and global components. They are multiplied by the geographic 
practice cost index (GPCI), which accounts for the cost of living in different locations, and finally a 
conversion factor, which converts the RVUs into a dollar value. Thus, Medicare payment = total GPCI-
adjusted RVU × conversion factor. The national GPCI is set at 1.0. If the cost of living in a particular area 
is higher than national average, then the GPCI is greater than 1 and if the cost of living is less than the 
national average, the GPCI is less than 1. The conversion factor is set on an annual basis by Congress and 
is used to convert RVU to a dollar amount. Diana L. Lam and Jonathan R. Medverd, How Radiologists 
Get Paid: Resource-Based Relative Value Scale and the Revenue Cycle, 201 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
ROENTGENOLOGY 947 (2013). 
 43. H.Rep. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 132 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 351 
(“House Report”) (“The bill . . . is intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face, promoting 
efficiency in the provision of services by rewarding cost/effective hospital practices.”); S.Rep. No. 23, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 53 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 193 (“Senate Report”) (“[PPS 
amendments] are intended to create incentives for hospitals to operate in a more efficient manner, since 
hospitals would be allowed to keep payment amounts in excess of their costs and would be required to 
absorb any costs in excess of the DRG rates.”). 
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The incentive to operate efficiently in the short run, however, is not the 
only, nor even the most, significant incentive generated by price controls. 
For example, they provide a powerful incentive to reduce the impact of 
the controls. Because PPS prices are based on the average accounting cost 
of treating a medical problem belonging to a particular diagnostic group, 
providers can readily reduce the impact of the controls by (1) assigning 
the medical problem to the diagnostic group likely to maximize 
reimbursement and (2) allocating more joint costs—such as the costs of 
maintaining and operating the buildings in a hospital complex, surgical 
suites, and pathology labs—to treatment costs. Probably the most 
important incentives created by price controls are for consumers to 
demand more price-controlled services and simultaneously for providers 
and potential providers to supply less.44 The PPS provides these 
incentives largely by setting below-market compensation for many 
services rendered to Medicare patients.45  
A provider might respond to the incentive to supply fewer medical 
services in a wide variety of ways. For example, a hospital administrator 
might reduce staffing and services and push physicians to discharge 
patients more quickly;46 a physician might simply limit the number of 
Medicare patients he sees.47 Because providers can respond in many 
 
 44. Distorted pricing coupled with limitations on efficiency-seeking activities that the distortions 
would ordinarily prompt is likely to give rise to fraud. Roger Feldman, An Economic Explanation for 
Fraud and Abuse in Public Medical Care Programs, 30 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 569 (2001). 
 45. According to the American Hospital Association, in 2016, Medicare reimbursed 87 cents and 
for every dollar hospitals spent caring for covered patients. “Underpayment by Medicare and Medicaid 
Fact Sheet, December 2017 Update,” https://www.aha.org/statistics/2018-01-03-underpayment-
medicare-and-medicaid-fact-sheet-december-2017-update. Using average price and accounting cost data 
to set reimbursement rates will necessarily result in below-market compensation. Even before the advent 
of PPS, Medicare provided powerful incentives for providers to supply less medical care simply by not 
covering a wide variety of relatively new procedures and drugs bearing high initial costs 
 46. Darren A. DeWalt, Significance of Medicare and Medicaid Programs for the Practice of 
Medicine, 27(2) HEALTHCARE FIN. REV. 79, 83 (2005-2006).  
 
The PPS provided a strong incentive for hospitals to provide fewer services during 
an admission and shorten the length of stay. The role of CMS as regulatory agency 
became even more important: it had to monitor for both overuse and underuse of 
appropriate medical care. 
 
 Id. 
 47. According to a survey conducted by the American Academy of Family Practitioners, 17% of 
its members refused new Medicare patients in 2017. AAFP Member Survey Provides Valuable 
Perspective, AAFP (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.aafp.org/news/blogs/inthetrenches/entry/20170801ITT_Survey.html. According to the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, it received 1,600 requests from physicians to opt-out of 
Medicare effective 2013, more than 3,500 effective 2015, 7,400 effective in 2016, and 3,732 effective 
2017. Opt Out Affidavits, Data.CMS.gov (Dec. 31, 2018), https://data.cms.gov/Medicare-Enrollment/Opt-
Out-Affidavits/7yuw-754z. (The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) 
eliminated the requirement that opting-out physicians reaffirm their position every two years.) 
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ways, the reduction in the supply of medical services can take a host of 
forms ranging from longer waits for an appointment to fewer life-saving 
procedures.48 Whatever form the reduction takes, it will cause many 
covered patients to experience delay in the receipt of appropriate medical 
services. Delay always ensues when a service or product is rationed on 
some basis other than price. Delay in the receipt of appropriate medical 
services would cause some patients to experience “only” fear, anxiety, or 
added discomfort, but it would cause others to experience pain, physical 
or mental deterioration, and in some cases, death. Such suffering could 
have prompted the patients and their families to punish Congressional 
supporters of PPS, but only if they blamed it for their suffering. This, they 
were unlikely to do; few patients would even appreciate that, absent the 
PPS regime, they might have received appropriate medical services more 
quickly. For them, information about the cause of their suffering may as 
well have passed beyond the “event horizon” of a “black hole.” 
Employers purchasing health insurance for their employees faced a 
potential drain on their coffers similar to the potential drain on the U.S. 
Treasury. But the executives of these employers lacked the power to 
promulgate price controls, much less the power to repeal or amend 
legislation. To limit the drain on their employers’ coffers they could: 
 
(1) purchase cheaper health insurance with higher deductibles and 
co-payments; 
 
(2) restructure their employee health plans as defined contribution 
or voucher programs;  
 
(3) offer to pay a smaller portion of the premiums; 
 
(4) decline to purchase health insurance for employees; or 
 
(5) engage “gatekeepers” to limit directly the amount of insured 
medical services that employees and their dependents 
purchased. 
 
The appeal of each of the first four options to any particular employer 
purchaser would depend in part on competition in the relevant labor pool, 
the demographics of the employer’s work force, and the employer’s tax 
situation. The appeal of the fourth option, the “gatekeeping” option, 
 
 48. Many examples appear in Stephen Westaby, OPEN HEARTS (Basic Books 2017); Robert 
Francis, REPORT OF THE MID STAFFORDSHIRE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST PUBLIC INQUIRY (2013): John 
Stossel, Sick Sob Stories, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2007), at A16. 
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increased dramatically when, in 1973, Congress enacted the HMO Act,49 
which: 
 
(1) subsidized the establishment of independent gatekeeping 
businesses, known as health maintenance organizations 
(“HMOs”); 
 
(2) required many employers who purchased health insurance for 
their employees—all that had employed an average of 25 or 
more employees during any calendar quarter of the preceding 
year—to offer their employees at least one HMO that met the 
standards set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e(b); and 
 
(3) limited state regulation of HMOs.50 
 
Enrollment in HMOs increased from less than two million members in 
197051 to more than 39 million in July 1992.52 These HMOs provided 
some insulation for employers from the costly fallout that follows from 
decisions to keep the gates closed. 
Patients enrolled in an HMO can escape the gatekeepers but only by 
incurring significant uninsured medical expenses. Patients who surrender 
to the gatekeepers experience a reduction in medical service just as 
patients covered by PPS-regulated Medicare do—with the same 
unfortunate, sometimes tragic, consequences: delay in the receipt of 
appropriate medical services, typically resulting in fear, anxiety, 
discomfort, or worse. 
When these consequences manifested themselves, they probably came 
as a surprise to most people. Proponents of Medicare and employer-
purchased HMO health insurance had not proclaimed that these programs 
would result in reduced medical service, much less human suffering. And 
few of the individuals covered by these programs had any reason to think 
 
 49. 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A § 300e et seq. Most of the HMO boom occurred after the implementing 
regulations were adopted in 1977. P.D. Fox & P.R. Kongstvedt, Chapter 1: Origins of Managed 
Healthcare, THE ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTHCARE (P.R. Kongstvedt, ed., 2007). 
 50. For example, the Act barred states from “1. [r]equir[ing] as a condition of doing business that 
a medical society approve of the furnishing of services by the entity; 2. [r]equir[ing] that physicians 
constitute all or a specified percentage of its governing body; 3. [r]equir[ing] that all physicians or a 
specific percentage of physicians in a locale participate or be permitted to participate in the provision of 
services for the HMO; 4. [r]equir[ing] that the HMO meet state requirements for health insurers respecting 
initial capitalization and establishment of financial reserves against insolvency that would prevent it from 
doing business in the state; and 5. Impose requirements which would prohibit the HMO from complying 
with requirements of the HMO Act.” 
 51. In fewer than 40 HMOs. P.D. Fox & P.R. Kongstvedt, Chapter 1: Origins of Managed 
Healthcare, THE ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTHCARE (P.R. Kongstvedt, ed., 2007). 
 52. InterStudy Competitive Edge, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Minneapolis InterStudy 1993) p. 1. 
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/3
2019] THE REGULATORY RATCHET 743 
about the likely consequences of their coverage—other than a short run 
reduction in out-of-pocket costs—because they had no practical 
alternative. Thanks to previous turns of the regulatory ratchet, most of 
them found that the principal alternative, purchasing their own health 
insurance, had become unavailable or prohibitively expensive. 
Had a practical alternative existed, it would have become 
extraordinarily attractive once the unfortunate consequences of Medicare 
and employer-purchased HMO health insurance became manifest. 
Indeed, the demand for a less restrictive alternative to HMOs prompted 
the eventual development of “Preferred Provider Organizations” which 
reimbursed “out-of-network” medical care but at a lower rate than for “in-
network” care, and employees flocked to them.53 But the development of 
PPOs took time. Extensive insurance regulation slowed the creation of 
PPOs. So, too, did the fact that PPOs did not appeal to some executives 
of employer-purchasers as much as they appealed to their employees. 
As the unfortunate consequences of Medicare and employer-purchased 
HMO health insurance became manifest, legislators stood to gain by 
railing about “‘heartless’ bureaucrats administering the PPS regime”54 
and “greedy” executives managing HMOs55—bureaucrats and executives 
who had done no more than conform to the laws passed by these 
legislators or respond to the incentives that these laws generated. 
 
 53. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employee Benefits Survey, participation in PPOs 
increased from 1% to 1986 to 16% in 1991 while participation in HMOs increased from 14% to only 17%. 
Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance, MONTHLY 
LABOR REVIEW 3, 9 (Mar. 1994). In 1983, Congress discontinued subsidies for HMOs. Pub. L. 97–35, 
title IX, § 947(c), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 577. Enrollment in HMOs continued to grow, fueled in large 
part by Medicare and Medicaid recipients, but enrollment in PPOs grew faster. By 2006, enrollment in 
HMOs amounted to 77.7 million; in PPOs 81 million. P.D. Fox & P.R. Kongstvedt, Chapter 1: Origins 
of Managed Healthcare, THE ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTHCARE (P.R. Kongstvedt, ed., 2007) (the 
authors acknowledge that it is difficult to classify hybrid plans). According to Managed Care Online 
(MCOL), by 2015, enrollment in HMOs had risen to 90.4 million, while enrollment in PPOs had grown 
to 156.4 million. Managed Care Fact Sheets: Current Enrollments, MANAGED CARE ONLINE, 
http://www.mcol.com/current_enrollment (the ratios are accurate, but the numbers are not because the 
study double counted spouses and dependents who had dual coverage and includes High Deductible 
Health Plans (HDHPs) which are classified as either HMOs or PPOs). 
 54. Delegating authority to bureaucrats enables the delegating legislators to mimic Captain Reneau 
in Casablanca, expressing their shock, shock, that the bureaucrats responded to the incentives created by 
the legislators. Holman W. Jenkins, Libertarian Dream of Pharmaceuticals, WALL ST. J. (OCT. 30, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/libertarian-dream-of-pharmaceuticals-1446238152. 
 55. Such railing was part of John Edwards’ successful 1998 campaign for the Senate. Time 
magazine reported that: 
 
at a panel discussion in Raleigh[,] [h]e condemned “health-care bureaucrats” who 
overrule doctors in determining a patient’s treatment, and asked, “Are we gonna 
put the law on the side of the patient or . . . leave it on the side of the big insurance 
companies?” 
 
James Carney, A Republican Who’s Taking His Medicine, TIME (July 13, 1998) at p. 30. 
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Legislators also stood to gain by appearing to “do something” about those 
unfortunate consequences. 
D. What’s a Politician to Do? Mandate More Coverages and More 
Elaborate Claims Review Processes 
Both Congress and state legislatures required that HMOs and other 
health insurance companies cover more services.56 To illustrate, New 
Jersey required coverage of extended stays in the hospital for women after 
giving birth,57 and most other states followed suit58 until Congress made 
the requirement nationwide.59 In 1996, Congress required that HMOs 
cover a laundry list of medical services.60 
 
 56. According to data compiled by the Council for Affordable Health Insurance, total state 
coverage mandates numbered 2,262 in 2011 (Victoria Bunce & JP Wieske, HEALTH INSURANCE 




KkQjoxcJ) up from 1,961 in 2008 (Victoria Bunce & JP Wieske, HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE 
STATES 2008, Council for Affordable Health Insurance (2009), https://www.heartland.org/publications-
resources/publications/health-insurance-mandates-in-the-states-2008), and just a handful in the 1960s 
(Victoria Bunce & JP Wieske, Mandate Update, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2008)). 
 57. 1995 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 452. 
 58. Debra S. Wood, Risky Business: Lending to Health Maintenance Organizations and Physician 
Practice Management Companies, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 322, 350 (1997). 
 59. NEWBORNS' AND MOTHERS' HEALTH PROTECTION ACT OF 1996, 29 USCA §1185, 42 USCA 
§300GG-4, AND 42 USCA §300GG-51. 
 60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e. 
 
A health maintenance organization shall provide, without limitations as to time or 
cost other than those prescribed by or under this subchapter, basic and supplemental 
health services to its members in the following manner: 
 
(1) Each member is to be provided basic health services for a basic health 
services payment … 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300e-1 defines “basic health services” as 
 
(A) physician services (including consultant and referral services by a physician); 
(B) inpatient and outpatient hospital services; 
(C) medically necessary emergency health services; 
(D) short-term (not to exceed twenty visits), outpatient evaluative and crisis 
intervention mental health services; 
(E) medical treatment and referral services (including referral services to 
appropriate ancillary services) for the abuse of or addiction to alcohol and drugs; 
(F) diagnostic laboratory and diagnostic and therapeutic radiologic services; 
(G) home health services; and 
(H) preventive health services (including (i) immunizations, (ii) well-child care 
from birth, (iii) periodic health evaluations for adults, (iv) voluntary family 
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Many state legislatures also mandated more elaborate claims review 
processes for HMOs and other health insurers. For example, New York 
required that HMOs and other health insurers provide for appeals of some 
adverse coverage decisions to a wholly unaffiliated agent in addition to 
their internal appeal processes.61 All states have adopted analogous 
legislation.62 
These mandates, however, could not reverse the reduction in medical 
care caused by HMOs because HMOs caused the reduction by creating 
incentives to providing less covered medical service. HMOs, whose 
profitability depends on creating such incentives, created them via the 
structure of physician compensation, care protocols, and barriers to 
referral.63 Neither coverage nor claims review mandates affect these 
disincentives. 
Nevertheless, mandating more coverage probably appeared to “do 
something” about the reduction in medical care caused by HMOs. After 
all, these mandates could be expected to, and no doubt did, result in some 
people receiving more medical services than they would have received 
 
planning services, (v) infertility services, and (vi) children's eye and ear 
examinations conducted to determine the need for vision and hearing correction). 
 
Such term does not include a health service which the Secretary, upon application 
of a health maintenance organization, determines is unusual and infrequently 
provided and not necessary for the protection of individual health. The Secretary 
shall publish in the Federal Register each determination made by him under the 
preceding sentence. 
 
 61. 1998 N.Y. Laws Ch. 586 § 11, N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 4910 to 4916, N.Y. Insurance Law 
§§ 4910 to 4916. 
 62. Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies to 
Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 233, 238 (2004). 
 63. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000), the Supreme Court observed:  
 
Like other risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs. At the least, HMOs, 
like traditional insurers, will in some fashion make coverage determinations, scrutinizing 
requested services against the contractual provisions to make sure that a request for care falls 
within the scope of covered circumstances (pregnancy, for example), or that a given treatment 
falls within the scope of the care promised (surgery, for instance). They customarily issue 
general guidelines for their physicians about appropriate levels of care. And they commonly 
require utilization review (in which specific treatment decisions are reviewed by a decision 
maker other than the treating physician) and approval in advance (precertification) for many 
types of care, keyed to standards of medical necessity or the reasonableness of the proposed 
treatment. These cost-controlling measures are commonly complemented by specific financial 
incentives to physicians, rewarding them for decreasing utilization of health-care services, and 
penalizing them for what may be found to be excessive treatment, [citations omitted]. Hence, 
in an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in providing less care, not more 
(emphasis added). 
 
Id. at 219. 
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otherwise, which sounds like a remedy for a reduction in medical care. So 
too does mandating more elaborate review processes because denied 
claims may result in a covered individual foregoing a medical service.64 
No doubt, the beneficiaries and their loved ones were pleased and stories 
about them played well in the media. 
 Proponents of these mandates argued that these “patient rights” would 
protect the sick from “denials of service” by “greedy” owners and senior 
managers of HMOs and health insurers. Interestingly, the “greedy” 
owners and senior managers of HMOs and health insurers, the most likely 
opponents of these state mandated “patients’ rights,” mounted little in the 
way of opposition. Perhaps they doubted their chances of political 
victory—or the duration of any such victory. Perhaps they feared that 
victory would serve mainly to fuel demand for more onerous regulation.65 
But some of them probably saw the upside of these “patient rights:” 
slowing the entry of competitors and eliminating some forms of 
competition.66  
 The mandates themselves probably helped speed information about 
how HMOs caused reductions in medical care toward the “black hole.” 
Mandating additional coverages made it even more difficult to analyze 
the physician compensation structures, care protocols, and referral rules 
used by HMOs. Mandating a more elaborate claims review process likely 
rendered some denied claims less visible by raising the cost of seeking 
review and thereby deterring some people from seeking it.67 More 
importantly, a more elaborate claims review process made denials look 
less callous and ham-handed and thereby tempered media interest in them. 
Less visibility and media interest reduced the chances that members of 
the public would learn of the denials—and this itself would foster the 
appearance that “something” had been “done” about “denials of service.” 
The coverage mandates may well have indirectly exacerbated the 
reductions in medical care caused by HMOs. Requiring HMOs and health 
insurers to cover more treatments and procedures triggers a rise in 
 
 64. Reversal of an insurer’s denial of coverage does not necessarily result in timely delivery of the 
services in question. Independent Medical Review Experiences in California, (IMR) Phase II: Cases 
Including Medical Necessity, INST. FOR MED. QUALITY, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION (2003), 
https://zdoc.site/independent-medical-review-expanding-legal.html. 
 65. So, too, would the fact that most of the providers who incurred these costs would incur them 
years after the legislation passed. 
 66. Robert Goldberg, Why HMOs Now Love Regulation, WALL ST. J. (July 17, 1998), at A15 col. 
4. 
 67. Karen Politzet al., Assessing State External Review Programs and the Effects of Pending 
Federal Patients’ Rights Legislation, Kaiser Family Foundation (2002). David M. Studdertand & Carole 
Roan Gresenz, Enrollee Appeals of Preservice Coverage Denials at 2 Health Maintenance Organizations, 
289 JAMA 864, 864 (2003). 
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premiums,68 prompting some potential customers to forego some health 
insurance coverage; and some people with less coverage may have 
foregone some medical care. The greater the reduction in medical 
services, the greater the political advantage of once again appearing to 
“do something” about this unfortunate consequence. 
E. More State Mandates: Coverage, “Community Rating,” and 
“Guaranteed Issue” 
State legislatures could have actually done something about the 
reduction in medical services caused by HMOs.69 They could have 
repealed or relaxed the health insurance regulations that limit entry, 
impose costs, and set premiums all of which help keep the price of health 
insurance up and the choice of policies down.70 For example, state 
legislatures could have repealed their limits on the sale of health insurance 
policies issued by out-of-state insurers.71 But these measures lacked the 
political appeal of additional turns of the regulatory ratchet (besides, the 
potential political advantage of appearing to do something about the 
unfortunate consequences of HMOs declined as PPOs expanded their 
membership at the expense of HMOs). 
Many legislatures adopted still more coverage mandates. For example, 
New York mandated coverage for alcohol and substance abuse treatment 
 
 68. Michael J. New, The Effect of State Regulations on Health Insurance Premiums: A Preliminary 
Analysis, Heritage Center for Data Analysis (October 27, 2005); William J. Congdon, Amanda Kowalski, 
& Mark H. Showalter, Effect of State Regulations on the Price of Health Insurance Policies in the Non-
Group Market, Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, D.C. (July 23, 2004) (“Mandated benefits 
raise the expected price of an individual policy by approximately 0.4 percent per mandate. For family 
policies the increase is approximately 0.5 percent per mandate. The typical state has about 20 mandates 
(with a range from 6 to 48) so a reduction from 20 to 10 mandates would imply a 4 percent decrease in 
price for individual policies, and a 5 percent decrease for family policies.” 
 69. Congress could have amended the income tax laws to give health insurance premiums the same 
treatment regardless of whether an individual or his employer purchased a policy. This would have made 
it appreciably cheaper for an individual to purchase his own policy and thereby escape his employers’ 
HMO gatekeepers. 
 70. State legislatures could have advanced this goal indirectly by limiting the risks created by 
malpractice liability. 
 71. The McCarran Ferguson Act places federal limits on the sale of cross border insurance policies, 
limits which were somewhat eased by ERISA and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Congress could have 
eased these limits further or eliminated them. A 2009 Manhattan Institute study reported the results of (i) 
a survey of New Yorkers showing that approximately 25% of the respondents would consider crossing 
state lines to buy insurance and (ii) a simulation showing that, if 25% percent of New Yorkers did just 
that, the number of uninsured New Yorkers would decline by 17%. Stephen T. Parente & Tarren Bragdon, 
Healthier Choice: An Examination of Market-Based Reforms for New York’s Uninsured, MANHATTAN 
INSTITUTE (Sept. 22, 2009), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/healthier-choice-examination-
market-based-reforms-new-yorks-uninsured-5937.html. 
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in 1987,72 and in 1988, certain out-patient mental health care73 and annual 
mammography screening for occult breast cancer for patients over forty-
nine years old.74 In the early 1990s, eight states did more; Kentucky,75 
Maine,76 Massachusetts,77 New Hampshire,78 New Jersey,79 New York,80 
Vermont,81 and Washington82 adopted “community rating,” “guaranteed 
issue” requirements, or both. 
 In its pure form, “community rating” requires an insurer to charge 
everyone in a given plan the same premium regardless of health and 
characteristics correlated with health such as age and sex. To illustrate, 
suppose that a healthy young woman and a sickly old man apply for the 
same coverage under the same plan. The insurer must charge the 
relatively low-risk woman the same premium as the relatively high-risk 
man. The insurer in this illustration would go bankrupt in short order if it 
were to charge both customers the premium actuarially-dictated for the 
healthy young woman. It must charge a premium higher than this. A 
higher premium, however, will make the policy less attractive to her and 
other low risk individuals, and fewer low-risk customers will require that 
the insurer either raise the premium for the same coverage or offer less 
coverage for the same premium. The threat of this vicious cycle, 
aggravated by mandated coverages, could—and did83—prompt insurers 
to exit the states that embraced community rating. 
Relaxing the community rating requirement can reduce, but not 
eliminate, the viciousness of this spiral. Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Washington embraced relaxed community rating 
requirements upon adoption; New Jersey and Washington did later.84 
 
 72. 1987 N.Y. Sess. Law Serv. 444 (McKinney).  
 73. 1988 N.Y. Sess. Law Serv. 98 (McKinney). 
 74. 1988 N.Y. Sess. Law Serv. 692 (McKinney). New York continued to mandate coverages, 
including treatment of autism spectrum disorder. 2013 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 56 (S. 2606-D) 
(McKinney). 
 75. Act of Apr. 15, 1994, Ch. 512, 1994 Ky. Acts 512, §55.  
 76. Act of July 13, 1993, Ch. 477, 1993 Me. Laws 477. 
 77. Act of July 24, 1996, Ch. 203, 1996 Mass. Acts 203.  
 78. Act of June 6, 1994, Ch. 294 1994 N.H. Laws 294.  
 79. Individual Health Insurance Reform Act, Ch. 161, 1992 N.J. Laws 161. 
 80. Act of July 17, 1992, Ch. 501, 1992 N.Y. Laws 501.  
 81. Act of May 11, 1992, 1991 Vt. Laws 160.  
 82. Act of May 17, 1993 Ch. 492, 1993 Wa. Sess. Laws 492.  
 83. Christopher F. Koller, Small Group Health Insurance Reform in New Hampshire, Report of 
the Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner of Rhode Island to the Joint Committee on Health Care 
Oversight (Feb. 2006), http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/healthinsurance/HI-
060227_NH_Reforms.pdf p. 24. A number of insurers had exited the New Hampshire market because it 
was less desirable for doing business there due to the restrictions on health insurer practices. This created 
the death spiral and deductibles were too high that lead to further declines in enrollment. Id. at p. 2. 
 84.  2008 N.J. lAWS 561-562 (Ch. 38, § 9 (“Modified community rating”)) (amending N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 17B:27A-2;.Act of Mar. 23, 2000, Ch. 79, 2000 Wa. ALS 79. 
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These relaxed requirements permitted premiums to reflect specified risk 
characteristics while limiting the variation in premiums that some of these 
characteristics could trigger. For example, Kentucky permitted premiums 
to reflect age, geography, and family composition, but it prohibited 
charging “the oldest policyholder in the group . . . more than three times 
the amount charged the youngest”85 and it limited geographic adjustments 
to 15%.86 
 In its pure form, “guaranteed issue” requires an insurer to sell a policy 
to anyone who pays the premium for it—regardless of the purchaser’s 
health status. Obviously, this requirement creates an incentive to delay 
purchasing insurance until its benefits can be claimed. Such delay 
increases the cost of providing health insurance because it makes 
assessing risk considerably more difficult, and it does so while 
simultaneously reducing revenues. To survive, an insurer must respond to 
this threat. It could charge higher premiums, reduce coverages, or both, 
which would make health insurance still more unattractive to people in 
relatively good health. Alternatively, it could exit the market. Exiting 
insurers, along with rising premiums and reduced coverages,87 led 
Washington to modify “guaranteed issue” to allow insurers to refuse to 
sell to individuals identified by a standard state questionnaire as “high 
risk.”88 Escalating premiums and declining coverages (often taking the 
form of higher deductibles) as well as exiting insurers led Kentucky89 and 
New Hampshire90 to abandon both “guaranteed issue” and “community 
rating,” Kentucky in 2004; New Hampshire in 2002. Massachusetts, New 
 
 85. Act of Apr. 15, 1994, ch. 512, 1994 Ky. Acts 512, §55; Michael Clark and Ginny Wilson 
“Market Responses to Kentucky’s Health Insurance Reforms” Center for Business and Economic 
Research, University of Kentucky, Gatton College of Business and Economics (Jan. 1998) 
http://cber.uky.edu/Downloads/health99.htm.  
 86. Act of Apr. 12, 1996, Ch. 371, 1996 Ky. Acts 371, §9. 
 87. According to Peter Suderman, The Lesson of Sate Health-Care Reforms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 
2009), at A21, a 1999 study presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Health Services 
Research reported that some Washington state health insurance premiums rose 78% in the three years 
following the guaranteed issue mandate and that within four years, all major carriers declined to offer 
individual insurance plans covering maternity. 
 88. Act of Mar. 23, 2000, Ch. 79, 2000 Wa. ALS 79. Leigh Wachenheim & Hans Leida, The 
Impact of Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Reforms on States’ Individual Insurance Market, 
Milliman Report to America's Health Insurance Plans (Mar. 2012) p. 49, http://docplayer.net/4806428-
The-impact-of-guaranteed-issue-and-community-rating-reforms-on-states-individual-insurance-
markets.html. Those identified were eligible for Washington’s high-risk pool insurance. 
 89. Act of Apr. 2, 2004, Ch. 59, 2004 Ky. Acts 59. 
 90. Act of July 17, 2001, Ch. 295: 3, 2001 NH ALS 295. Christopher F. Koller, Small Group 
Health Insurance Reform in New Hampshire, Report of the Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner 
of Rhode Island to the Joint Committee on Health Care Oversight (Feb. 2006) p. 24, 
http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/healthinsurance/HI-060227_NH_Reforms.pdf. A number 
of insurers had exited the New Hampshire market because it was less desirable for doing business there 
due to the restrictions on health insurer practices. This created the death spiral and deductibles were too 
high that lead to further declines in enrollment. Id. at p. 2. 
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Jersey, and New York retained both, practically insuring that health 
insurance premiums in these states would exceed premiums in other states 
by a wide margin. 
F. Congress Doubles Down: “Obamacare” 
Congress could have done something about the reductions in medical 
care caused by both the PPS regime and HMOs. It did not. It certainly 
declined to reverse any previous turns of the regulatory ratchet. Indeed, it 
double downed on many of them91 when it enacted the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act,92 frequently abbreviated as the “ACA” and 
commonly known as “Obamacare.” (It also mandated a yet more 
elaborate claims review process.93) For example, rather than attempt to 
weaken the link between employment and health insurance, the ACA 
attempts to strengthen the link with an “employer mandate.” This mandate 
applies to employers who had 50 or more employees working “full 
time”—at least 30 hours per week—in the preceding year.94 The ACA 
provides that these employers must offer ACA-compliant health 
insurance to at least 95% of his employees and the employees’ dependents 
or become subject to a non-deductible fine, which the ACA calls an 
 
 91. Congress double downed on the PPS regime by providing for the creation of an unusually 
independent administrative agency—the Independent Payment Advisory Board or “IPAB”—empowered 
to cut Medicare payments to doctors and hospitals if government actuaries were to find that Medicare 
spending would soon exceed specified caps and Congress failed to promptly prevent this from happening. 
42 U.S.C. § 3403 (2010). Congress repealed this provision before the IPAB came into existence. 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub.L. 115-123 § 52001. 
 92. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (to be codified at 26 
USC § 38B(c)(2)(C)(i)(I),(II)), 124 Stat. 910 (2010), amended by The Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 216. For further analysis, see, Kopp, Paley, 
Bacon and Foster on Health Care Reform Legislation, 2010 Emerging Issues 4954 (LexisNexis). 
 93. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119 §§ 2719 and 
3321 (implemented by 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 and a series of “technical releases” issued by the Department 
of Labor available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/technical-
releases 
 94. The ACA made the employer mandate effective in 2013, but President Obama and several 
executive agencies, including the Department of the Treasury and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
(CMS), announced that they would delay its enforcement. In 2013, they announced a delay until 2015. In 
2014, they announced that the delay would continue until 2016 for employers who had less than 100 
covered employees. In 2014, they also announced that they would provide some relief for employers with 
100 or more covered employees during the 2015 “transition” period.94 These employers could: 
 
(1) fulfill the employer mandate by offering compliant health insurance only to 
employees working 35 or more hours per week (but an employer doing this would 
have to certify that it had not shrunk employee numbers in order to qualify), and 
(2) avoid some penalties by showing that they offer complying health insurance to 
at least 70% of their full-time workers. 
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“assessment payment.”95 
Rather than eliminate state insurance coverage mandates, the ACA 
mandates its own. To be ACA-compliant, health insurance sold to 
individuals or small employers must cover “essential benefits.”  
According to Congress,96 these include: 
 
• preventive and wellness services,97 
 
 95. If an employer subject to the ACA fails to offer health insurance providing statutorily 
determined “minimum essential benefits,” he may have to pay a fine if one of his full-time employees 
purchases his own insurance and receives a subsidy in the form of a “premium tax credit.” 26 USCA § 
4980H (“Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage”). The ACA set this fine 
initially at $166.67 per month ($2,000 per year) for each full-time employee in excess of 30 and provided 
for annual adjustment of the amount. In 2017 the fine is $188.33 per month ($2,260 per year). Even an 
employer who offers health insurance providing statutorily defined “minimum essential benefits” to at 
least 95% of his employees and the employees’ dependents may become subject to a fine if (1) he failed 
to offer it to the full-time employee who purchased his own insurance and received a “premium tax credit” 
or (2) if the premium for the insurance that he offered exceeded 9.66% of that employee’s “adjusted” 
income. In these two situations, the ACA set the fine initially at $250 per month ($3,000 per year) for 
each employee who receives a “premium tax credit.” The fine is adjusted annually; in 2017 it is $282.50 
per month ($3,390 per year) IRS. See Employer Shared Responsibilities Provisions, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/employer-shared-responsibility-provisions (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2017). An employer may also become subject to a fine for requiring eligible employees to 
wait more than 90 days for coverage. PPACA § 4980H(b)(1) – (3). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (2012). The statute empowers the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to specify required services for each statutory category. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2) (2012). These 
requirements, which are reviewed periodically, vary based on the state requirements. Section 18022(b)(4) 
(2012) sets forth the factors that the Secretary must consider when setting these requirements. On February 
20, 2013, the Health and Human Services released a final rule setting forth health insurance issuer 
standards related to the coverage of essential health benefits. Information on Essential Health Benefits 
(EHB) Benchmark Plans, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/data-resources/ehb.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2017). 
 97. The Health Resources and Services Administration interpreted “preventive and wellness 
services” as including annual well-woman preventive care visits, including preconception and prenatal 
care, screening for gestational diabetes, HPV testing for women over 30 (no more than once every three 
years), annual counseling on sexually transmitted infections for all sexually active women, annual 
counseling and screen for HIV, breastfeeding support and counseling (including the cost of renting 
breastfeeding equipment), annual screening for urinary incontinence, post-pregnancy screening for 
diabetes mellitus annual screening and counseling for interpersonal and domestic violence, and all FDA-
approved contraceptive methods, sterilization methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling for all women with reproductive capacity, as prescribed. HRSA Women’s Preventive Services 
Guidelines Notice, 81 Fed. Reg. 95148 (Dec. 27, 2016). HRSA Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines 
Notice, 83 Fed. Reg. 8487 (Feb. 27, 2018) added annual screening for urinary incontinence and post-
pregnancy screening for diabetes mellitus. These HRSA guidelines become law by virtue of Treas. Reg. 
§54.9815-2713T(a)(1)(iv): 
 
(a) Services—(1) In general. A group health plan, or a health insurance issuer 
offering group health insurance coverage, must provide coverage for and must not 
impose any cost-sharing requirements (such as a copayment, coinsurance, or a 
deductible) for— (iv) With respect to women, such additional preventive care and 
screenings not described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of § 54.9815–2713 as provided for 
in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration. 
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• ambulatory services, 
• pediatric services, including oral and vision care, 
• maternity and newborn care, 
• treatment of mental health and substance abuse, 
• prescription drugs, 
• emergency services, 
• hospitalization, 
• laboratory services, and 
• rehabilitative care. 98 
 
Rather than embrace mechanisms used by commercial insurance 
companies to cope with moral hazard risk, the ACA prohibits or limits the 
use of these mechanisms. Compliant policies may not saddle an insured 
individual with the annual cost of “essential benefits” in excess of 
specified dollar amounts99 (zero in the case of preventative and wellness 
services is zero100), nor may they limit the total annual or lifetime benefits 
paid for an insured.101 Requiring unlimited annual and lifetime benefits 
makes capping total outlays, and therefore risk, appreciably more 
difficult. Limiting the annual costs of “essential services” that a customer 
may bear—limits on the “out-of-pocket” maximum and annual 
deductible—adds to this difficulty. More importantly, these limits restrict 
the ability of an insurer to give its customers an incentive to economize 
on covered services. 
 On the whole, Obamacare functions much like Medicare even though 
it uses different mechanisms. It is the difference in mechanisms that 
makes Obamacare more vulnerable politically, as I will explain shortly. 
The ACA’s coverage mandates and prohibitions and limitations on the 
use of mechanisms to cope with moral hazard risk put considerable 
upward pressure on premiums. Even more pressure derives from the ACA 
provisions mandating that premiums comport with “community rating” 
 
 98. PPACA § 1302 (“Essential Health Benefits Requirements”). Even catastrophic-only policies, 
which insurers may sell to those under age 30 must cover “essential benefits” and allow for at least three 
visits to a primary care provider. Employers offering “minimum essential coverage” must provide 
qualified employees with a voucher that can be applied to purchase of a health plan through an “insurance 
exchange.” 
 99. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13. In 2017, the “out-of-pocket” maximum is $7,150 for an individual 
customer, $14,300 for a family (The “out-of-pocket” maximum is lower for a customer whose income 
falls below 400% of the statutorily defined “poverty level.” It is also lower—$6,550 for an individual, 
$13,100 for a family—for a policy that may be used in connection with a Health Savings Account 
(“HSA”)). The annual deductible may not exceed $2,600 for an individual, $5,150 for a family. The ACA 
also prohibits a compliant policy from limiting an insured’s choice of network doctors or requiring pre-
approval for covered care in an emergency room. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19a. 
 100. This provision became effective immediately. 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17. 
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requirements102 and that insurance companies abide by its “guaranteed 
issue” policy.103 
This pressure may have been mitigated in the short term by the ACA’s 
limit on an insurance company’s “medical loss ratio” or “MLR,” the ratio 
between benefits paid and premiums charged. Under the ACA, the federal 
government requires insurers to spend 80% of revenue from premiums 
received for individual and small-business plans on health benefits. For 
large employer plans, the share is 85%. If an insurer falls short, it has to 
rebate the extra money to customers. In the long run, however, the MLR 
limit may reinforce the upward pressure on premiums by giving insurers 
an incentive to accept price increases by doctors, hospitals, and 
pharmaceutical makers. Accepting a price increase permits an insurer to 
raise its premiums without running afoul of the MLR limit, and if it raises 
its premiums, it can retain 20% or 15% of the higher premium. To 
illustrate, suppose the premium for an individual policy is $100; the 
insurer spends $80 on benefits and retains $20. Now suppose that a 
hospital increases the price of a covered service by $20. The insurer now 
spends $100, so it raises the premium to $125, keeps $25, and still 
complies with the MLR limit. 
The upward pressure on premiums was mitigated by transfers 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
from insurers with relatively low cost or low risk insureds to insurers with 
relatively high cost or “high-risk” insureds. The “risk corridor” and 
“reinsurance” programs, which expired in 2016, provided for transfers to 
insurers with relatively high-cost insureds, but never paid what they 
promised to pay. The “risk adjustment” program provides for payments 
to insurance companies with relatively “high risk” insureds. “High risk” 
appears in quotation marks because the HHS calculates each insurer’s risk 
profile on the basis of information submitted by each insurer about the 
 
 102. Under the ACA, insurers may vary rates based on the number of family members enrolled in 
the plan, charge different rates in different areas across within a state, charge older adults as much as 3 
times what the insurers charger younger ones, and charge tobacco users as much as 1.5 times what they 
charge those who do not use tobacco products. 
 103. The “community rating” and “guaranteed issue” requirements became effective in 2014 except 
for “grandfathered” plans, plans in effect on the day that Obamacare was enacted, March 23, 2010, which 
had not undergone any substantial change. The ACA barred these plans from enrolling any new insureds. 
Meanwhile, the number of insured dwindled with each passing year as individuals covered by 
grandfathered plans went to work for a different employer, moved to a different state, found a different 
plan more attractive, aged into Medicare, or died. In North Carolina, for example, BlueCross BlueShield 
of North Carolina saw the number of individuals covered by its grandfathered plans drop from about 
330,000 in 2010 to about 50,000 in 2017. See Gary Bolt, ACA Grandfathered Plans Will Expire Dec. 31, 
2017 – Individual Customers have Options for 2018 ACA Coverage, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD (Aug. 
16, 2017), http://blog.bcbsnc.com/2017/08/aca-grandfather-plans-will-expire-dec-31-2017-customers-
options-2018-aca-coverage/. As no new customers had joined this pool since 2010, the pool of insureds 
not only shrank but became older and sicker, and so more expensive to insure. Effective January 1, 2018, 
the company discontinued its grandfathered plans. Id. 
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demographics of its insureds and the clinical codes for their treatment; 
codes that lend themselves to favorable selection by the insurer. 
Despite these transfers, the average premiums in the individual market 
of the 39 states where Obamacare exchanges are federally run increased 
105% from 2013 to 2017, according to the Health and Human Services 
Department.104 In dollar terms, this increase amounts to about $3,000 a 
year for the average family.105 
Higher premiums always prompt some purchasers of health insurance 
to economize. Some individuals who would have purchased health 
insurance for themselves or their families will decline to do so.106 The 
demand dampening effect of higher premiums may be offset for some 
because of subsidies, paid as tax credits, authorized by the ACA.107 These 
subsidies are available, however, only to people who earn less than 400% 
of the “poverty level” and who purchase insurance on Obamacare 
exchanges, where fewer policies are offered each year. 
Because of higher premiums some employers who would have 
purchased health insurance for their employees will decline to do so—
even though they become subject to fines under Obamacare. For many 
employers, the fine would amount to considerably less than the cost of the 
insurance.108 Moreover, employers can escape the ACA and avoid the risk 
of fines for violating its employer mandate by employing fewer than 50 
or more individuals working at least 30 hours per week. Such an employer 
might substitute independent contractors for employees or reduce the 
working hours of the people that they do employ.109 Some potential 
employers may refrain from expanding or never set up shop. 
 Even as premiums have risen, insurers have cut back on the variety of 
policies they offer and their provider networks,110 and some have simply 
exited many states and counties. They have done so largely to avoid the 
vicious spiral threatened by Obamacare’s “community rating” and 
“guaranteed issue” requirements. The exit began on a relatively small 
 
 104. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Serv., Individual Market Premium Changes: 2013-2017, 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/256751/IndividualMarketPremiumChanges.pdf. 
 105. How to Read an ObamaCare Prediction, WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2017), at A10. 
 106. Scott Thurm, Restaurant Chains Cut Estimates for Health Law Costs, WALL ST. J. (March 27, 
2013). 
 107. If an employer subject to the employer mandate fails to offer ACA-compliant insurance to one 
or more of his employees, these employees may purchase such insurance on Obamacare “exchanges” and 
become eligible for taxpayer funded subsidies. 
 108. Philip Breeden, Obamacare’s Incentive to Drop Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2010), at 
A17; Janet Adamy, Uncle Sam to Pay More of the Tab for Health, WALL ST. J. (July 28, 2011). 
 109. Julie Jargon, Louise Radnofsky, & Alexandra Berzon, Health-Care Law Spurs a Sift to Part-
Time Workers, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2012). 
 110. Debra J. Saunders, Obamacare's next problem: Doc shock, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Dec. 
11, 2013); Chad Terhune, Insurers Limiting Doctors, Hospitals in Health Insurance Market, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013). 
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scale shortly after the ACA was passed when the “guaranteed issue” 
requirement became effective for policies covering only “children” 26 
years of age or younger.111 Aetna, Cigna, WellPoint, Humana, and 
UnitedHealth Group’s Golden Rule subsidiary stopped selling new child-
only policies.112 The “guaranteed issue” requirement became generally 
applicable in 2014. In 2017, Allegian, Community First, 
UnitedHealthcare, Coordinated Health Mutual, Healthspan, Wellcare, 
Health Choice, and Scott and White withdrew from the individual health 
insurance marketplace.113 In 2018, Aetna, Humana, and Affinity did 
likewise.114 
Higher insurance policy premiums are likely to command and hold the 
attention of health insurance customers much more than higher Medicare 
payroll taxes are to command and hold the attention of taxpayers. 
Likewise, reductions in insurance policy options are likely to command 
and hold the attention of health insurance customers more than limited 
Medicare options are to command and hold the attention of present and 
future participants in this practically compulsory government program. 
Moreover, the higher premiums and reduced policy options caused by 
Obamacare have been brought home annually. This is because a typical 
health insurance policy has a one-year term and because, until 2018, most 
people not covered by employer-purchased ACA-compliant insurance 
risked a fine every year if they failed to purchase one for themselves 
(Obamacare’s “individual mandate”). As a result, the causal relationship 
between Obamacare, on the one hand, and higher premiums and reduced 
options, on the other, has not slipped beyond the event horizon into an 
informational “black hole”—despite efforts at information suppression. 
These efforts include (1) widely publicized committee hearings during 
which Senators or Representatives demand that insurance executives 
justify their premium increases115 and (2) scrutiny of such increases by 
the Department of Health and Human Services which opines on their 
“reasonableness.”116 This may help explain why Congress managed to 
 
 111. Julian Pecquet, Stronger Children’s Coverage Rules May Raise Insurance Costs, THE HILL 
(July 25, 2010), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/110775-stronger-rules-for-childrens-health-
coverage-may-raise-insurance-costs. 
 112. Janet Adamy & Avery Johnson, Rate Increases Denied to Some Private Medicare Plans, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2010). 
 113.  Error! Main Document Only.Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox & Larry Levitt, Insurer 
Participation on ACA Marketplaces, 2014–2019, Kaiser Fam. Found. (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/insurer-participation-on-aca-marketplaces-2014-2019/ 
(follow “Map Data” direct download link). 
 114.  Id. 
 115. See, e.g., the February 2010 hearings before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Energy & Commerce of the House of Representatives. At the February 24, 2010 
session, members of the Subcommittee grilled Angela Bray, then CEO of Wellpoint, Inc., about the 
company’s planned premium increases and her critique of what became Obamacare. 
 116. Janet Adamy, Health-Plan Rates to Draw Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2010), at B1. 
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repeal the “individual mandate” effective January 2019, and came close 
to repealing or cutting back the reach of other key Obamacare provisions. 
As long as the other key provisions are neither repealed nor cut back, 
Obamacare will continue to keep premiums up and policy options down. 
This will cause some people to incur uninsured medical expenses and 
cause some to forego the timely receipt of some medical services. This 
state of affairs may prove unsustainable politically. The individuals 
suffering these unfortunate consequences and their self-styled advocates 
will demand that “something be done” about them. Commercial insurance 
companies will probably not “solve” the “problem” because the ACA has 
made it difficult to do so profitably. This will make additional turns of the 
regulatory ratchet attractive to many politicians. 
PART III: THE UTILITY OF THE REGULATORY RATCHET MODEL  
 That regulation tends to beget more regulation does not qualify as 
breaking news. Indeed, opponents of some proposed regulation, including 
Obamacare,117 have invoked this observation when making their case. 
Understandably, however, they have not argued that it is a characteristic 
of all, or almost all, regulation and, therefore, a critical consideration in 
the cost-benefit analysis of every proposed regulation. It will probably not 
become a critical consideration until turnings of the regulatory ratchet are 
tracked in a wide variety of contexts. 
 Possible instances of the regulatory ratchet at work abound. Here are 
three, the first bearing on executive pay, the second on residential housing 
construction, and the third on mortgage lending. 
Executive pay 
The compensation of senior managers of public companies depends in 
part on the prospect that they will be displaced if they receive more than 
their market value. A takeover, especially a hostile one, is the ultimate 
displacement mechanism, so the threat of one tends to discipline such 
managers. Federal118 and state statutes regulating takeovers have rendered 
them costlier and riskier, thereby reducing the incentive to initiate them. 
The disciplining power of a takeover threat has declined accordingly. This 
has facilitated an increase in the compensation of senior managers at some 
public companies, and this increase has helped fuel comparable increases 
 
 117. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Now, Can We Have Health-Care Reform?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
24, 2010). 
 118. 82 Stat. 455 (1968). The Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Perhaps 
the most significant amendment was the addition of §13(d) which requires disclosure by persons or groups 
who acquire beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any publicly traded equity securities. 
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at other companies as they compete for top managerial talent. Eye-
popping salaries have made for attention-getting stories in the media and 
among the commentariat, stories often coupled with calls for Congress to 
do something about those salaries. Congress did not pare back its 
regulation of takeovers or preempt that of the states. Rather, Congress 
amended the tax laws to make salaries in excess of $1 million paid to top 
managers non-deductible for the corporation paying them.119 Obviously, 
this changed the relative value of salaries vis-a-vis other forms of 
compensation, such as perks, performance bonuses, and stock options. Of 
these non-salary forms of compensation, stock options have attracted the 
most coverage, much of it critical, from the media and the commentariat. 
This prompted Congress not to repeal the amendment to the tax laws but, 
along with federal administrative agencies, to adopt measures to regulate 
the granting and exercising of the options. 
Residential housing construction.  
A wide variety of statutes and regulations adopted in the name of 
safety, environmental protection, and aesthetics raise the cost of 
residential housing construction, sometimes dramatically as in coastal 
California.120 The resulting higher housing prices most afflict people with 
the least financial resources. Of course, they see the scarcity of acceptable 
housing available at prices within their budgets as a problem; a problem 
about which someone ought to do something. Politicians and bureaucrats 
in federal, state, and local governments have responded not by rolling 
back the costly laws, but by adopting statutes and regulations that coerce 
the construction of “affordable housing” or subsidize it. 
Mortgage lending 
During the Great Depression, many states enacted statutes that 
 
 119.  I.R.C. § 162 (m). 
 120. In 2015, California’s Legislative Analyst Office estimated that “the cost of building a typical 
single–family home in California’s metros likely is between $50,000 and $75,000 higher than in the rest 
of the country.” One contributor to the difference was “the average development fee levied by California 
local governments (excluding water–related fees)” which according to a 2012 national survey, “was just 
over $22,000 per single–family home compared with about $6,000 per single–family home in the rest of 
the country. “California’s High Housing Costs: Causes and Consequences” (March 17, 2015), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housing-costs.aspx. The difference will grow 
beginning in 2020 when solar panels become mandatory on all new California homes pursuant to rules 
adopted by the California Energy Commission in May 2018. Energy Commission Adopts Standards 
Requiring Solar Systems for New Homes, First in Nation, California Energy Commission News Release 
(May 9, 2018), http://www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2018_releases/2018-05-
09_building_standards_adopted_nr.html. The Commission estimates that the mandate will add $8,000 to 
$12,000 to the cost of a home. California Prays to the Sun God, WALL ST. J. (May 12-13, 2018), at A12. 
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increased the risks associated with mortgage loans. For example, twelve 
states, including California and Texas, require that lenders make 
mortgage loans non-recourse.121 Twenty-seven states prohibit or 
substantially limit pre-payment penalties and statutes.122 Of course, 
 
 121. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (2018); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-729 (2018); 
California: CAL. C. CIV. PRO. § 580b (Deering 2018); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (2018); 
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 45-1512 (2018); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 582.30(2018); North Carolina: N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38A (2018); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-
03 (2017); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 86.797 (2018); Texas: TEX. PROP. CODE § 51.002 (2017); Utah: 
UTAH CODE § 57-1-32 (LexisNexis 2018); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (LexisNexis 
2018). 
 122. Alaska: ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 14-515 (2019) (unfair or deceptive acts include 
charging a prepayment penalty that violates ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(g), i.e. loans covering one- to 
four-family dwellings may be prepaid without a penalty except federally insured loans that require a 
prepayment penalty); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-449 (2018) (prepayment penalty is capped at six 
months’ advance interest); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-39-513 (2018) (no prepayment penalty after 
the 36 month period after the issuance of the loan and the 3%, 2%, and 1% pf the loan principal amount 
cap for prepayments made within first, second, or third 12 month period following the issuance of the 
loan, respectively); California: CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10242.6 (Deering 2018) (for single-family, 
owner occupied properties, prepayment penalty is allowed only within the first seven years of the issuance 
if the prepayment exceeds 20% of the unpaid balance in any 12-month period); Colorado: COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 11-38-103 (2018) (no prepayment penalties on reverse mortgage); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 36a-746c (2018) (no prepayment penalties on high cost home loan); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 28-
42-306 (2018) (prepayment penalty is allowed in the first three years of the contract and should not exceed 
6-month interest); Illinois: ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, § 1050.1187 (2018) (penalty provisions are 
prohibited for payments made after 36 month period following the issuance of the loan, or exceeding 3%, 
2%, and 1% for prepayments made within first, second, or third 12 month period following the issuance 
of the loan, respectively); Indiana: IND. CODE § 24-4.5-3-209 (2017) (prepayment penalty capped at 2% 
of the amount prepaid may be imposed within three years from the contract date); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 
535.9 (2018) (mortgage on owner-occupied residential property can be prepaid without a penalty); 
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5512 (all home loans may be prepaid with a penalty not to exceed 1.5% 
of the prepayment); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.8-110 (LexisNexis 2018) (no prepayment 
penalty after 3 years from mortgage origination and during the first 3 years it is not to exceed 3%, 2%, 
and 1% for prepayments made within first, second, or third 12 month period following the issuance of the 
loan, respectively); Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:3532.1 (2018) (caps on prepayment penalty based on 
the year of prepayment); Maine: 02-029-119 ME. CODE R. § 4 (2018) (borrowers have the right to prepay 
in whole or in part without penalty at any time); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-105 (2018) 
(prepayment penalty may be imposed only within the first 3 years from the date of loan origination and is 
capped); Massachusetts: 209 MASS. CODE REGS. 32.32 (2018) (prepayment penalties for high cost 
mortgages are prohibited without exception), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 56 (2018) (prepayment penalty 
for a dwelling of 4 or less household or owner-occupied properties is not allowed if mortgage is prepaid 
after 36 months from the issuance, and if it is paid before then the penalty shall be the lesser of the balance 
of the first year’s interest or the three months’ interest), 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 8.06 (2018) (it is an unfair 
or deceptive practice to charge a prepayment fee which violates MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 56, 
significantly deviates from industry standards, or is otherwise unconscionable); Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 408.036 (2018) (prepayment penalties are prohibited after five years from the origination date); New 
Jersey: N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3:15-10.1 (2018) (a borrower may repay a mortgage loan at any time without 
penalty); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-30 (no prepayment penalty on a home loan); New York: 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(3)(b) (2018) (prepayment penalties are limited to the first year of a 
mortgage loan); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.011 (prepayment penalty is not allowed on 
residential mortgages of less than $75,000); Oregon: OR. ADMIN. R. 441-730-0205 (2018) (prepayment 
penalties are permissible unless there is a refinance by the same financial institution, a foreclosure, or 
payment with insurance benefits due to the death of the borrower); Pennsylvania: 10 PA. CODE § 7.8 
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lenders took the increased risk into account in setting rates and extending 
credit which especially pinched people with low and moderate incomes. 
The Community Reinvestment Act,123 as it was eventually interpreted by 
banking regulators, effectively imposed minimum quotas for loans to 
such people. Meanwhile, Congress and federal administrative agencies 
required that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the secondary mortgage 
market giants, purchase these loans which meant reducing their 
underwriting standards. This manifested itself in a number of ways, 
including the authorization of subprime and Alt-A mortgages for 
impecunious borrowers. When the resulting housing bubble burst, 
Congress did not repeal the Community Reinvestment Act nor the laws 
effectively requiring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to reduce their 
underwriting standards. Instead, Congress, along with federal 
administrative agencies, substantially increased the regulation of retail 
financial institutions in general and mortgage lenders in particular.124 
Tracking the ratchet’s turnings in a wide variety of contexts would 
facilitate refinement of the model sketched in this article. Presently, this 
model does not explain whether, in some circumstances, the ratchet might 
generate forces that would diminish with each succeeding turn. Nor does 
it explain why the ratchet ever fails to work, although the fact that 
opponents of Obamacare came as close as they did to repealing a 
substantial portion of it suggests that failure to suppress information about 
the impact of the regulation may play a critical role. 
Even with a more refined model, taking account of the regulatory 
ratchet will prove challenging because it requires predicting future turns 
and their consequences. The resulting uncertainty may make it 
impractical to take account of the ratchet in a meaningfully quantifiable 
manner. Qualitative observations, however, might still prove useful. It 
might be useful, for example, to identify ratchet-turning forces that a 
proposed regulation would likely generate. Moreover, if prior regulations 
had generated similar forces, say moral hazard risk, it might also prove 
useful to identify the turns of the regulatory ratchet that these forces had 
powered and to estimate the costs of these turns.125 
 
(2018) (prepayment penalty on residential mortgage obligations is prohibited); Rhode Island: 11-2 R.I. 
CODE R. § 3:5 (no prepayment penalty is allowed on high cost home loans); South Carolina: S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 37-23-80 (2018) (no prepayment penalty on loans of less than $150,000); Texas: 7 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 83.707, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 153.7 (2018) (prohibiting prepayment penalties on secondary 
mortgage loans and equity loans); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 9, § 45 (2018) (prepayment penalty is 
prohibited). 
 123. 12 U.S.C. 2901 (2018) (implemented by Regulations 12 CFR parts 25, 228, 345, and 195). 
 124.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac went into receivership and were largely untouched by the new 
regulations. 
 125. Some opponents of Obamacare did this. See, e.g., Holman Jenkins, Now, Can We Have Health-
Care Reform?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2010), at A15.  
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